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A comparison of the models and 
methods of surveillance in East 
Germany and Northern Ireland 
and their relevance to modern-day 
securitization of society 
Cliodhna Pierce 
Abstract 
Despite increasing awareness of the rise in societal surveillance as a result 
of leaks by former NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden and subsequent 
revelations from Wikileaks, the damage of pervasive surveillance practices on 
the individual and on communities has yet to be measured.  As John Gilliom 
has argued, ‘until we are able to generate sufficient research to make 
plausible sense of how differently situated people – welfare mothers, 
prisoners, students, middle-class professionals – speak of and respond to their 
various surveillance settings, we will be unable to devise a meaningful 
account of what surveillance is’ (2006, 126). Before we can examine the 
impact and influence of surveillance on these or other segments of society, we 
must examine the pervasive nature of general surveillance techniques.  The 
objective of this paper is to consider in detail the historical techniques of 
government surveillance on communities in Northern Ireland (NI) and the 
former East Germany (GDR). By looking at these two models of surveillance 
societies, we can begin to compare and contrast the differences in strategies 
used in a democracy and a dictatorship. Using these two examples of two 
heavily surveilled communities, taking a detailed look at five techniques in 
particular, we gain insight into the implantation of surveillance practices used by 
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different political model structures.  The aim is to explore the similarities and 
differences in strategies used in both states, allowing us to assess the trajectory 
of future surveillance tactics and its relevance in the securitization of society 
today. 
Introduction: Surveillance, power and risk-based profiling 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers – Article 19, The United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948 
As historic and biblical narratives make plain, the idea of surveillance and the 
need for it are not new. Links between surveillance power and control has roots 
in biblical texts for example, the notion of the all-seeing, omnipresent God 
creates the perception that our behaviour is constantly monitored. We may 
therefore modify our actions in an effort to please the Almighty with virtuous 
behaviour. 
Today, most surveillance theory is focused on governmental use of surveillance 
and its impact on shifting power dynamics resulting from the surveillance state. 
In their thesis Imagining Security 2007, Wood and Sheering argue, ‘Power is 
understood as being everywhere, not because it is exercised everywhere, but 
because it is viewed as coming from everywhere’ (2007: 9).Foucault takes this 
observation a step further, suggesting that power is a tool for modifying our 
actions, making us compliant with states’ expectations of our behaviour: ‘Power 
is not a thing but rather an anonymous strategy that is exercised via tactics and 
techniques in concrete practices. The anonymity indicates power exists in action’ 
(2004: 14). 
In light of the post 9/11 world and the rise of groups such as the Islamic State, 
the need for proactive surveillance measures appears to outweigh our ability to 
self-determine how our information is used. As Pfaff suggests: ‘Proactive 
surveillance seeks out potentially dangerous individuals, conspiracies and 
deviant opinions, before they act, are publicly expressed or put into action. A 
sphere of privacy or right of personal conviction is not recognized or respected’ 
(Pfaff, 2001: 387). 
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The securitisation of surveillance centred on enforcing rules and regulations has 
overtaken its original function of protection. Our understanding of public 
discourse, freedom of expression and boundaries between the individual citizen 
and the State has fundamentally changed.  Autonomy and existential action are 
subject to hostile scrutiny and compliance has been redefined as ‘non suspicious’ 
behaviour. This new approach enables the state to justify forcing these rules on 
its citizens so they can live a safer life. As Marc Schuilenburg points out: ‘Security 
is an ordering concept. We order our lives in the hope of a safe existence’ (2015: 
9). 
The contemporary role of surveillance in preventing terrorist attacks must be 
taken into account. Various stakeholders see risk-based profiling as an essential 
component of the new strategy of preventative policing as, for example, Pat 
O’Malley, quoting Colquhoun, maintains ‘the prevention of crimes and 
misdemeanours is the true essence of police’ (O’Malley, 2010: 168). However, 
Castel takes an alternative view, seeing this position as a two-dimensional 
approach that does not take into account the full picture of the individual 
targeted: ‘In the case of risk, the subject is deconstructed, so to speak, through 
the use of statistical techniques. Thus, ‘surveillance is practiced without any 
contact, or any immediate representation of the subjects under scrutiny’ (Castel, 
1991: 288). 
Given ongoing threats of violence posed by sectarian groups such as the 
Provisional IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force, who carried out indiscriminate 
bomb and gun attacks, the surveillance techniques and risk-based profiling used 
in Northern Ireland arguably became an indispensable tool for preventing 
possible terrorist threats. However the Catholic population were perceived as 
the greater threat to security and became the main targets for surveillance 
operations. In the case of East Germany (German Democratic Republic or GDR), 
surveillance helped identify threats to the state apparatus; however, as nearly 
everyone was seen as a risk, the task became so monumental that it also became 
unsustainable. In light of the new risk-based policing strategy, the state powers 
must ensure a balanced approach. Surveillance must be carried out in way that is 
seen to be just, fair and proportionate if it is to be deemed legitimate in the eyes 
of those under surveillance, often the general public at large.  
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There are growing concerns among critics about the levels of intrusion by 
surveillance stakeholders into the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. Much of 
the work currently undertaken in the area of surveillance studies suggests that, 
while there have been many positive policing results from the new surveillance 
techniques, disadvantaged groups are often disproportionately targeted. In 
McCahill and Finns’ work on risk-based profiling, they point out that ‘[i]n the 
context of policing and criminal justice, surveillance powers continue to be 
disproportionately directed towards those shorn of economic and cultural capital 
in a way that reinforces existing social divisions’ (2014: 175).  
With security services’ use of criminal profiling, this form of social sorting is 
leading to people often becoming targets of surveillance because of their 
background or how they look, regardless of how they behave. Many academics 
such David Lyon in his work on Everyday Surveillance also argue that this form of 
profiling, reinforces stereotypes, creating social divisions in many communities.  
Conservative critiques suggest that surveillance is not sinister or coordinated but 
that it is an inevitable and organic consequence of the manner in which the 
threat presents itself. Radical critique by contrast would argue that in fact this 
further alienates and divides society, acting as a threat multiplier however 
unintentional. As Neman and Hayman note,  
‘social sorting’ highlights the classifying drive of contemporary 
surveillance. It also defuses some of the more potentially sinister aspects 
of surveillance processes (i.e. it’s not a conspiracy of evil intentions or a 
relentless and inexorable process). Surveillance is always ambiguous 
(2013: 167). 
In the case of Northern Ireland, the minority Catholic populations was seen as 
the greater risk to security and, as a result, was disproportionately targeted, 
further fuelling community division. In the GDR, however, everyone was seen as 
a risk to the state, and no one was exempt from coming under the scrutiny of the 
Stasi.  
It must be noted, however, that modern surveillance is all encompassing in 
nature, which sees all citizens as being enemy of the state or the ‘Other’. As 
David Lyon suggests, this allows for little trust by the government in its own 
citizens: ‘Those in positions of authority do not trust or are seeking grounds to 
trust those below them’ (2002: 37). It can be said that in Northern Ireland and 
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East Germany under the Stasi, the state chose not to trust its citizens and as a 
result normalized surveillance states emerged.  
Background 
To compare surveillance strategies used in GDR and Northern Ireland, the history 
of and rationale for surveillance operations in these two states must be taken 
into account. Both cases can be examined and analysed through Foucault’s 
model of surveillance outlined below. 
In traditional models of surveillance power flows from the surveyors 
(government or corporate actors) to the surveyed.  In this concept, power 
is something possessed by an authority that is ‘exerted over things’, 
which can ‘modify use, consume or destroy’ (1982, p.786). 
The East German State Security Service, commonly known as the Stasi, 
implemented a frightening regime of surveillance, infiltration and terror for over 
40 years. Its sole objective was to control citizens and prevent the growing tide 
of emigration to West Germany that nearly caused the economic collapse of the 
East German communist state. By creating an atmosphere of fear, disharmony 
and mistrust, it hampered spontaneous communication and social cohesion 
critical for change.  
Many people believe this omnipresent surveillance by state actors in the GDR 
contributed to the collective compliance of citizens in this repressive system. 
Solove, in his book Ubiquitous and Pervasive Computing, quotes Justice Cohen to 
the effect that our individuality is lost in the idea of persistence state of 
monitoring: ‘[P]ervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the 
margin, incline choices toward the bland and the main-stream’ losing as she 
describes ‘the expression of eccentric individuality’ (Solove, 1972, p. 156). 
In contrast, the Northern Ireland surveillance state was the result of civil rights 
protests by the Catholic minority looking to end discriminatory voting, housing 
and employment policies. Their demands led to intensifying political tension and 
intercommunity violence between the Protestant/unionist and 
Catholic/nationalist communities. This, in turn, resulted in the deployment of the 
British Army to quell the waves of violence, terrorist attacks and street protests 
that gripped the region. Its aim was to end violence and restore order through 
on-the-ground tactical surveillance strategies. The British establishment 
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however, based on past colonial experience, chose a coercive militarised 
response to what was a civil liberties and rights-based issues to begin with. This 
provocative and militarised policing exacerbated the roubles essentially 
becoming a threat multiplier. Many similarities can be drawn with today’s police 
forces facing increasing threats from radical elements of society, as O’Malley and 
Hutchinson imply when they note that ‘the development of police as a quasi-
military form of organization and the growth of a police culture … emphasizes[] a 
form of masculine heroism’ (2007: 385). 
An analysis of five surveillance techniques 
The following section will consist of a detailed analysis of five common 
surveillance techniques used in both Northern Ireland and East Germany. These 
techniques will be discussed and categorised using Johnston and Shearing’s five 
characteristics of the securitisation of the state, as mentioned in Governing 
Security and outlined below: 
Order: the way citizens ought to be, set of explicit and implicit norms 
about acceptable public behaviour.  
At least one willing actor active in the programme ensuring supervision, 
control and order maintenance. Formal or informal organisation. 
Personal instruments of the actor: communication skills, intelligence and 
charisma. 
Tools and technologies: a whole range of innovative inventions or 
discoveries.  
Physical instruments: eavesdropping, searching premises and inspecting 
posts. 
If the surveillance techniques of these states and their implementation are 
examined in detail, it can be seen that the methods used in both cases are 
strikingly similar despite differences in their underlying rationales. 
1. Order: technique – internment and imprisonment 
The threat of jail as a result of information gathered through pervasive 
surveillance practices has been used by regimes for decades with great success. 
In many cases, within the strategy of a zero-tolerance policy, the threat of jail is 
often used as a deterrent to criminal activity. Schuilenburg observes that in the 
scenarios where zero-tolerance policies are implemented ‘directions of problem 
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resolution such as prevention and extensive control mandates are regarded as 
being more effective in preventing evil than those classic control methods of 
criminal justice’ (2015: 33). 
Foucault also observed that ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility … assures the automatic functioning of power’ (Foucault, 
1977: 201). Many commentators raise concerns about the encroachment of 
private firms in the criminal justice system and see this as the beginning of the 
commodification of surveillance and security. Private security sees it operational 
focus in terms of profit and loss, not with regard to the benefit of society as a 
whole. As Shearing and Stenning note, there has been an ‘emergence in the 
private sector of a more instrumental form of control in which environments 
[are] being constructed in order to minimize opportunities for unwanted 
behaviour’ (Shearing & Stenning, 1985: 301). 
In East Germany, this tactic evolved after the region’s post–Second World War 
annexation by the Soviet Union. In the beginning of the 1950s, the focus was on 
violent repression of the opposition, which led to the imprisonment and torture 
of political activists. From the 1970s to the fall of the GDR, the focus moved away 
from physical torture to psychological intimidation. This often led to much-
publicised show trials that, for many, ended in convictions and jail without any 
legal representation. According to research undertaken by Maercker and 
Schützwohl, ‘By recent estimates, approximately 180,000 individuals were 
imprisoned for political reasons in the former GDR’ (1997: 436). 
In Northern Ireland, the threat of jail as a means of restoring social order was 
introduced with the policy of internment without trial. This policy saw the 
minority Catholic population targeted through surveillance; this resulted in many 
of its community members subjected to long periods of indefinite incarceration 
without any legal protections. Although some of those interned had terrorist 
connections, many innocent citizens endured similar torturous techniques as 
those used in the GDR state security, and as a result, they became radicalised. Ed 
Moloney states that a staggering two percent of Derry City’s 50,000 Catholic 
population was imprisoned for IRA activities in the years between 1971 and 
1986’ (2007: 20). 
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2. Active player: technique – citizen surveillance 
Alongside the increased securitisation of streets across the UK and Europe, the 
use of innovative collaborations, such as community watch programmes, are 
being actively promoted by local police forces.  We are increasingly encouraged 
to be the eyes and ears of police patrols, who urge us to flag potential suspect 
behaviour. In conjunction with these community-based initiatives, the media 
also calls on the public to help track down possible targets suspected of criminal 
behaviour through what many consider citizen surveillance.  
Marc Schuilenburg, whose work has developed many of the surveillance 
assemblages that dominate today’s urban landscapes, cites ‘the input of 
knowledge and experience by concerned inhabitants in order to enable a more 
distributive and more effective form of security observance’ (2015: 48). Tops in 
his 2007 paper analysing local political environment in Rotterdam takes this 
increased securitisation of society one step further, suggesting there is now an 
increasing intertwining of community, policy and crime prevention: ‘There are no 
project managers but rather urban marines, no goals but rather target, no 
neighbourhood teams but rather intervention teams no security policy but 
security approach’ (Tops, 2007: 293). 
Many see this citizen surveillance approach as divisive in nature because it 
enforces societal stereotyping and does not take the context of the suspicious 
behaviour into account. As Feeley and Simon argue in their comparison of old 
and new constructs in penology (a section of criminology that deals with the 
philosophical and practical): ‘While the Old Penology tried to identify criminals to 
ascribe guilt and blame and to impose punishment and treatment, the New 
Penology seeks techniques for identifying, classifying, and managing groups 
sorted by levels of dangerousness’ (1994: 180). Lee and Stenson add, that public 
spaces today, ‘consist of the myriad ways in which populations and spaces are 
investigated, classified and formulated as objects and concerns for government’ 
(2007: 4).  
It can be said that this creates division within communities as it establishes the 
idea of ‘them’ versus ‘us’. ‘Within the articles themselves, the targets of 
surveillance were specifically Othered; through linguistic strategies that separate 
them; from the rest of us’(McCahill & Flynn, 2014: 32). 
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Similarly, the Stasi co-opted, forced and encouraged its citizens to watch each 
other on an unprecedented scale. By 1988, the Stasi had over 90,000 full-time 
Stasi operatives and a further 105,000 informers. Its extensive network of agents 
permeated all spheres and institutions of daily life, from psychiatric clinics to the 
judicial system. This sense of an all-seeing, all-watching surveillance state acted 
as an instrument of control over its citizens. Department V oversaw these 
operations; its main function was to identify dissension, halt resistance activities 
and expel or jail political opponents. The mandatory denunciation law, which 
had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, made failure to 
denounce fellow citizens a crime that could result in a jail term of up to five 
years.  
Gathering intelligence in Northern Ireland was more challenging than it was in 
GDR. This was due to the inherent suspicion of close-knit communities about 
those conducting surveillance activities. The bulk of intelligence information was 
obtained through on the ground visible, overt sources, such as stop and 
searches, indiscriminate house raids, and curfews. This enabled the British Army 
to compile profiles of people’s familial and political associations. It was also able 
to identify ‘visitors’ and those who appeared out of place.  
As, Zurawski has noted, ‘citizens of Northern Ireland have been far more 
conscious of the presence of surveillance cameras for longer than those in the 
rest of the United Kingdom’ (2005: 499). 
3. Personal instrument: technique – infiltration 
The infiltration of civic groups has been used extensively for centuries as 
governments sought to control dissent and restore order. In the case of both 
Northern Ireland and East Germany, this tactic was used frequently both to 
gather information and to identify targets. The infiltration of civic communities 
became so great in Eastern Germany that it had the effect of inflating dissident 
groups’ membership base: ‘The issue is further complicated by the paradox that 
there were so many IM’s (Informal Collaborators) it actually helped the 
opposition movement, partly simply by swelling its ranks, but also by actively 
working on opposition activities’. (Miller, 1997:194). 
In his book The Firm, Bruce interviews Matthias Piekert, a former Stasi 
informant, who provides an insider perspective into this fixation with IMs: ‘[T]his 
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obsession with informants and their reports was the greatest weakness of the 
Stasi: it led to poor quality reports on the population and distracted from duties 
of safeguarding economic and military sites’ (2010:63).  
In Northern Ireland, the practice of infiltration was more targeted and tactical as 
opposed to a wide spread invasive strategy used in East Germany. Nonetheless, 
the techniques for coercing people into becoming informants and the 
undercover operations that took place within terrorist organisations were similar 
to those used in the GDR. That said, during The Troubles infiltration and 
surveillance techniques were used by all sides. The PIRA (Provisional Irish 
Republican Army) and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) used surveillance to 
determine potential targets for terrorist operations and to obtain tactical 
knowledge of the enemy. For the British Army, surveillance was a necessary 
technique to identify imminent terrorist threats; however, the surveillance 
operations were primarily focused on the Catholic community. As Bamford 
remarks:  
In some cases, the security forces recruited young Catholic males in their 
early teens and persuaded them to join the PIRA (Provisional Irish 
Republican Army). Urban estimated that between 1976 and 1987, the 
security forces received information from approximately 50 informers. 
Penetrating the group at a number of levels had several benefits, the 
most important being that if one agent was compromised, others 
(unknown to him or her) would remain in place. (2005:592) 
British Security forces also allowed attacks to go ahead and even mounted terror 
attacks themselves, the Miami Showband massacre being one high profile 
example. This raises huge ethical questions about the role the army played in 
instigating terrorist campaigns, which further ignited violence on both sides. 
Writing in 1977, Paul Wilkinson observed that a ‘dangerous consequence of a 
large and ill-controlled secret intelligence and subversion apparatus is that it may 
end up recruiting assassins and ‘dirty tricks’ operators for special assignments’, 
adding that the danger was that the organisation could get ‘out of control’ 
(Wilkinson, 1977:136). 
4. Tools and technologies: technique – a. innovative technologies 
We are more aware today than ever before of how the use of innovative 
surveillance technologies has infiltrated our daily lives, from the 
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commodification of our web searches that lead us to online purchases that 
algorithms ‘think’ we should make, to tracking devices on our phones that can 
reunite us with them with a click of a button. This surveillance has bled into our 
streets with the evolution of CCTV cameras. Many of us are unaware that we are 
under the constant watch of security forces as soon as we enter our city centres. 
As Pat O’Malley and Steven Hutchinson suggest, ‘In a host of mundane ways 
using innocuous or covert devices such as railings, cameras, gates and signposts, 
authorities were ‘invisibly’ channelling people into orderly and conforming 
behaviour, focusing not so much on disciplining individuals but on regulating 
mass distributions and flows’ (2007: 373). 
In their study Surveillance, Capital and Resistance, McCahill and Flynn imply that 
media reporting reaffirms the belief that through innovative new technologies 
we are being watched in a similar fashion to people living in East Germany and 
Northern Ireland during the 1970s and ‘80s: ‘Within these articles surveillance 
technologies act as tools to reveal that they are among us’(2014: 30). 
The technological innovations used by the Stasi in East Germany have been well 
documented, ranging from breaking into and bugging the apartments of 
opposition leaders to the use of sophisticated listening and recording devices 
planted in obscure places. As Anna Funder describes in Stasiland, the Stasi 
deployed technical innovations with great success:  
A flower pot, a watering can, a petrol canister, and a car door, all with 
cameras of varying sizes hidden in them. Examples of these include a 
thermos with a microphone in its lid, a hiking jacket with a camera sewn 
into the lapel pocket, and an apparatus like a television antenna that 
could pick up conversations 50 meters away in other buildings or while 
you were in your car stopped at lights.(Funder, 2003: 71) 
These tactics were subtle and often implemented ‘under the radar’ so that the 
community remained largely unaware of them. Despite rumours of mass 
surveillance, they remained difficult to prove. The constant perception of being 
watched acted as a deliberate psychological strategy designed to instill fear and 
mobilise control. 
This situation differed considerably from the strategy used in Northern Ireland, 
where the main purpose of surveillance was allegedly to restore social order in 
the face of increasing violence. However, for many it was seen as a bold 
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statement of ‘you are occupied’, ‘we are in control’. By making technology visible 
to the civilian population, such as with CCTV cameras and patrol cars, people 
were very much aware that they were being observed. They were, therefore, less 
willing to risk punishment by causing trouble in those areas that were obviously 
being watched. It should be noted that, at the beginning of the Troubles, the 
focus of surveillance was on predominantly Catholic communities with 
nationalist leanings, thus further inflamed tensions. 
In a study on the use of intelligence in Northern Ireland, Bamford gives a detailed 
picture of the technologies used:  
The system included: the use of helicopters for border surveillance; the 
introduction of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) to patrol and to 
man covert observation posts in South Armagh; the use of ‘Listeners’ and 
‘Watchers’ along with ‘bugging’ devices in most public places; as well as 
the capability of more intrusive methods, such as planting ‘bugging’ 
devices in specified targets’ homes and vehicles. (2005: 594) 
4. Tools and technologies: technique – b. data collection 
With the advent of the digital age, we are now at a crossroads in terms of 
surveillance. Governments now have the ability to access our information 
through a variety of technological innovations, with little or no protection or 
transparency for citizens in terms of how this information is used. As Parsons 
maintains, ‘intersubjective-based privacy model registers that aggregated 
metadata can be deeply harmful to a given person’s or community’s interests 
and even provoke individuals to retreat based on fears of potential 
discrimination’ (2015: 6). 
However, O’Malley and Hutchinson see this new ‘data-veillance’ as an important 
innovation from a crime-prevention perspective: 
Whereas the collection of crime data had previously been linked primarily 
to issues of the social causes of crime, in new developments they were 
being used to inform the identification of risk factors, typified by the 
practice of situational crime prevention. In place of evidence on ‘broken 
homes’, ‘anomie’ or ‘zones of transition’ – with their implications for 
social justice concerns – the new statistical evidence related to security, 
to the identification of criminogenic situations. (2007: 374) 
Similar traits of this new move towards modern data collection practices can be 
seen in methods used to accumulate the notorious Stasi files. The pervasive 
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nature and extent of the data collection resulted in a paper legacy of 178 
kilometres of filed material. The information contained in these files came from 
reports, direct contacts with targets and mail interception practices. Since 1991, 
Stasi victims have had access to their files, which has led to their discovery that 
close personal friends and family had been Stasi informants. By allowing access 
to these files, victims of Stasi now have full discloser of any surveillance 
operation carried out on them or their families by the orders of the state. This 
has had a beneficial impact in helping unified Germany move forward in the 
process of truth and reconciliation. In Northern Ireland by contrast, lack of 
transparency and accountability has seen many family’s awaiting justice for their 
loved ones for decades. 
Much of the information gathered in the Stasi files detailed the banal, day-to-day 
lives of targeted individuals. The sheer volume of information often led to 
inaccurate and incompetent analysis of the targets, as Barbara Miller suggests: 
‘IM’s were engaged in the amassing of vast amounts of often seemingly trivial 
pieces of information which could potentially be used in the operative 
Zersetzung (decomposition, corrosion, undermining) of the enemy’ (1997:18).  
In Northern Ireland, data collection methods of surveillance can be understood 
from Bamford’s analysis of the British Army’s land operations, heavily influenced 
by Britain’s colonial past: ‘good observation, constant patrolling and the quick 
passage of information’ were considered relatively simple ways to acquire 
background information. According to Keith Maguire, those activities enabled 
the army to build ‘a street-by-street and family-by-family analysis of the no-go 
areas’ (2005: 587).  It is interesting to note that the document Bamford used for 
his analysis was intended for military operations but the tactics were applied to 
policing strategy used against the citizens of Northern Ireland.  
Solove argues that this intrusion into the personal sphere through bulk data 
collection leads people to become virtual prisoners: ‘Such supportive relations, 
networks, and forms of life are denied to persons and populations subject to 
persistent and pervasive surveillance; the collection and retention of personal 
information can cause people to become prisoners of their recorded pasts and 
lead to deliberate attempts to shape how their pasts will be remembered’ (2008: 
746). Unlike the days of literal wiretapping, when authorities needed human 
agents to listen in, digital intelligence is today an agent in its own right. 
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5. Physical instruments: technique – border security 
There is no more comprehensive way of keeping people under surveillance than 
by controlling and restricting their movements. With the current influx of 
refugees and migrant workers, there is increasing pressure on government 
agencies to control borders. Border control is fast becoming a tool to control the 
flow of citizens while marking out others for surveillance. Schuilenburg highlights 
the significant role that space and flow represents to current policing strategy: 
‘The increased significance of “the space of flows” advocates… a different 
organisation of police function. Now taking the disappearance of borders and 
high mobility as a starting point, the police will have to pay more attention to 
flows and locations where flows converge, the so called nodes.’ (2015: 34). It can 
be argued that, given the importance placed on this aspect of securitisation, 
instead of disappearing, borders are remerging not only as a political tool such as 
with the Brexit negotiations but also one used to combat potential terrorist 
threats. The Trump election campaign for example, clearly demonstrated how 
rhetoric focused on terrorism can be used to mobilise discourses around the 
issue of border security. It ignores the fact that most terror threats are internal 
not external. 
Zizek suggests that this type of control disproportionally affects those individuals 
seen as a risk due to the increased use of profiling by security forces. Those with 
both economic and cultural capital are thus oblivious to the impact this has on 
those targeted. Profiling like surveillance leaves vulnerable citizens open to 
hostile scrutiny. 
On the one hand the cosmopolitan upper and middle class academic, 
always with the proper visa enabling him to cross borders without any 
problems in order to carry out his (financial academic…….) business and 
thus able to ‘enjoy the difference’; on the other hand, the poor 
(im)migrant worker driven from his home by poverty or (ethnic religious) 
violence for whom the celebrated hybridality designates a very tangible 
traumatic experience never being able to settle down properly and 
legalize his status (Zizek, 1999: 220). 
 
In East Germany (GDR) during the 1950s, one-quarter of the population decided 
to emigrate to West Germany. In response, the Berlin Wall was erected to stop 
this enormous flow, which was proving catastrophic to the fragile economy. 
Irish Communications Review vol 16 (2018) 
 
 
 
198 
Special restrictions were imposed along the East German–West German border, 
which regulated the movements of those living in the GDR. Through visas, 
passports and other difficult-to-navigate documentation, the border police could 
track citizens’ movements, whom they were visiting and the purposes of their 
visits.  The state security used maximum force along the border wall, which 
resulted in the deaths of 825 people killed trying to flee: ‘East Germany had 
become a giant prison. Those still trying to get out risked being blown to bits by 
landmines and automatic artillery devices along the western border. Border 
guards had orders to fire on anyone trying to scale the wall’ (O’ Koehler, 1999: 
374). Similar parallels can be seen today as borders are increasingly closed in 
order to curb what many refer to as the emerging migrant crisis in Europe. 
In Northern Ireland, the building of walls was subtler, completed over a longer 
period with the main purpose of separating the two polarised communities. 
However, the walls had the added benefit of controlling people’s movements 
into and out of certain areas. This control of movement helped the army build 
profiles of suspect individuals augmenting the intelligence that had already been 
gathered. The ironically named ‘peace walls’ have come to be seen as a symbol 
of the Troubles, a barrier to integration and a contentious issue that further 
fuelled suspicion on both sides.  
Conclusion 
While the era of the modern surveillance state provides many with a sense of 
security, some fear that the danger lies in the potential for local communities to 
be exclusively governed in the name of security. Marc Schuilenburg suggests that 
‘[t]he punishment of harmful behaviour is only important when it leads to a 
reduction of risk’ (2015: 37). 
The two kinds of techniques have been identified by Von Hirsch and Shearing. 
The first is based on personal profiling where ‘[i]t is assumed that certain 
individuals have specific characteristics that indicate a heightened risk of criminal 
behaviour. The second technique, based on exclusion, ‘is directed towards 
rebuffing of people who have been already convicted of violating certain rules’ 
(Hirsch & Shearing, 2000: 162). These two techniques hold within them the 
possibility of creating a disenfranchised population due to increased use of police 
profiling. It can be argued this was the case in Northern Ireland, where the 
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Catholic population was seen as the potential threat. In East Germany, on the 
other hand, every citizen who spoke out in defiance of the state was seen and 
looked on with suspicion; in other words, everyone was a potential target. 
When looking at the context in Northern Ireland and East Germany, surveillance 
had the same aim of rooting out all opposition and controlling dissent and 
dissonance by voluntary or forced compliance: ‘The function of the secret police 
in such regimes is not only to root out opposition and discourage dissent but to 
regulate the political and moral conduct of both ordinary citizens and 
functionaries of the state’ (Pfaff, 2001:400). While in Northern Ireland secret 
police were not prevalent, the British Army carried out a similar function.  
In both cases, Northern Ireland and East Germany, surveillance became part of 
day-to-day life. Its presence became a normalised and accepted intrusion into 
the private sphere of its citizens. However, as Stephen Pfaff suggests in his piece 
on the limits of surveillance, this acceptance of surveillance is not guaranteed 
long-term, as can be seen in the historical experiences of Northern Ireland and 
Eastern Germany: ‘Such a regime may secure compliance so long as its power 
seems unassailable, but once its authority is threatened it may suddenly 
experience a revolt that is a more accurate reflection of the popular sentiments’ 
(2001: 21). Pfaff also provides a stark warning to governing powers, noting that 
‘[f]or the most part, policymakers should focus on past examples of harm, but 
they should not ignore undeniable indicators of future harm’ (Pfaff, 2001: 21). 
As Christopher Parsons emphasises in Beyond Privacy, in a world where all our 
communications have the possibility of coming under surveillance, ‘The crux of 
the argument is that pervasive mass surveillance erodes essential boundaries 
between public and private spheres by compromising populations’ abilities to 
freely communicate with one another and, in the process, erodes the integrity of 
democratic processes and institutions’ (2015: 1). 
Taking these case studies as examples, we can gain insight into how modern-day 
surveillance techniques can impact our society. It is worth noting that the 
chairwoman of the US Federal Trade Commission Edith Ramirez warned in her 
keynote speech at the Consumer Electronics Show that, in the near future, 
‘Many, if not most, aspects of our everyday lives will leave a digital trail [that] 
will present a deeply personal and startlingly complete picture of each of us – 
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one that includes details about our financial circumstances, our health, our 
religious preferences and our family and friends’ (Ramirez, 2015). 
We must be cognizant in a world that is overwhelmed by the perception of the 
imminent terrorist attack this fear is not exploited by the state to exert its 
control over citizens. As David Lyons warns, ‘the idea of exploiting uncertainty in 
the observed as a way of ensuring their subordination has obvious resonance 
with current electronic technologies that permit highly unobtrusive monitoring 
of data subjects in a variety of social contexts’ (Lyon, 1993: 655). 
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